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Abstract 
This study aims to test within a relatively homogeneous group of small states what 
differentiates the growth performance of Pacific island countries (PICs) from their peers. We 
find that PICs are disadvantaged by distance and hampered by lower investment and exports 
compared with other small island states, but greater political stability, catch-up effects from 
lower initial incomes, and slower population growth have helped offset some of these 
disadvantages. On balance, policy-related factors, together with geography-related 
disadvantages, have led to growth rates in PICs that are much lower than in other small states. 
We also examine how real exchange rate appreciation, unfavorable developments in the 
external trade environment, and rising international transport costs may have contributed to 
PICs’ slower growth over the past decade.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Economic recovery in most Pacific island countries (PICs) following the global financial 
crisis has been weak.2 While the two resource-rich countries, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and 
Solomon Islands, have rebounded strongly on the back of high commodity prices, most other 
countries are still struggling with slow growth: annual GDP growth averaged just 0.3 percent 
during the period 2008-2010. With such slow growth, at least six PICs out of the eleven IMF 
members have yet to reach their pre-crisis per capita GDP levels. Slow income growth has 
made it more challenging to reduce poverty and youth unemployment, which has been a 
major social-economic issue in the region and need to be urgently addressed.3 
Beyond the recovery, a key challenge is how to raise the growth rate in PICs over the 
medium term. The slow economic recovery in many PICs partly reflects the fact that they 
entered into the global financial crisis with a weak momentum of growth—weak recovery is 
often associated with weak growth. But what is more concerning is the secular decline in 
economic growth in the Pacific over the past decade, again, with some exceptions. This is in 
sharp contrast with developing countries in other parts of the world, most of which have 
managed to raise growth over the same period. Of particular interest is the comparison with 
other small states and low-income countries, which grew three times as fast as PICs during 
the 2000s after growing at a similar rate during the 1990s. 
Does this mean that PIC economies are performing below their potential, especially over the 
past decade? There is a large body of literature that examines the economic growth 
performance of PICs compared with other country groups and relative to their own growth 
potential. Economic geography suggests that small states such as PICs are disadvantaged in 
economic growth: small country size makes it harder to exploit economies of scale, and 
remoteness and insularity increase the cost of transportation for international trade and 
technology dissemination. The empirical results are, however, inconclusive, complicated by 
                                                 
2 The focus of this study is the 11 Pacific island countries that are members of the International Monetary Fund: 
Fiji, Federated State of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Republic of Marshall 
Islands (RMI), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
3 See the Forum Communiqué of the 42nd Pacific Islands Forum, Auckland, 7-8 September, 2011, and Noble, 
Pereira, and Saune (2011).  
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how to take into account the unique characteristics of small states in terms of country size 
and geographical location. 
Against this background, we attempt to address the following questions in this paper: (1) to 
what extent has economic growth in PICs been slower than other small states and other 
similar country groups? (2) have natural conditions, such as small size and geographical 
location, and external shocks, such as fuel prices and changing trade preferences, played a 
role in determining PICs’ long-term growth? (3) why has growth in PICs slowed over the 
past decade? and (4) how might economic and other policies have affected PICs’ growth 
performance?  
We use a unique set of data for small states to examine PICs’ growth performance and its 
determinants in comparison with other countries that have similar characteristics. Previous 
attempts to analyze growth in PICs tend to lump them together with other small states or 
examine them in isolation. We also take a long-run perspective in analyzing PICs’ growth 
and pay particular attention to the declining performance over the past decade. In doing so, 
we examine the broad international environment as well as internal factors, including through 
case studies, that may have contributed to slowing growth in PICs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II puts the questions we raised above in 
context by providing an overview of PICs’ economic performance of the past decades in a 
broad regional and global perspective. Section III provides a brief review of the growth 
constraints in small states. Section IV provides an overview of the methodology and data 
used in the econometric analysis, followed by an attempt, in Section V, to identify and 
quantify growth determinants in small states, and in PICs in particular, with the aim to 
distinguish the role of natural conditions from policy-related factors. Section VI tries to shed 
some light on why growth in PICs has slowed over the past decade, and Section VII 
discusses the implications of the empirical findings for economic policies. Section VIII 
concludes.  
II.   GROWTH PERFORMANCE—STYLIZED FACTS 
It should be noted at outset that our focus on growth performance does not imply that this 
should be the sole criterion for assessing economic success. As noted by many, PICs have 
made considerable progress on many aspects of development, including Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Nevertheless, as recognized in the development literature, 
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growth is fundamental to poverty reduction and broad human development, and its continued 
improvement is crucial for sustaining such development in the Pacific. 
Overall, economic growth in PICs has lagged behind peer groups (Figure 1). In the 1970s, 
the PIC economies grew at a respectable rate of just below 4 percent per year, albeit still not 
as fast as low-income countries (LICs) 
and other small states on average.4 The 
1980s was a slow-growth decade for 
PICs, but LICs and small states’ 
performance was also weaker. The 
1990s saw PIC growth rebound and 
nearly caught up with LICs’, but this 
was followed by a sharp divergence 
during the 2000s. Although the 
acceleration of LICs contributed most to 
this divergence, it is also evident that 
PICs had the weakest growth in four 
decades, managing to grow at only one-
third the rate of LICs.5 
There have been considerable variations 
in economic growth across PICs 
(Figure 2). The two resource-rich 
economies in the region, PNG and 
Solomon Islands, riding on world 
commodity booms, had a dramatic 
change in fortune over the last decade, 
                                                 
4 The definition of LICs is based on the current IMF classification. It should be noted that, as pointed out by 
Winters and Lim (2010), LICs’ growth performance tends to be understated as some countries that were LICs in 
the early years have moved out of the group because of their faster economic growth. The classification of small 
states is based on Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank (2000), with population below 1.5 million except 
PNG. These countries are listed in Appendix II. ECCU includes Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
5 Despite the food and fuel price shocks and the global financial crisis, average growth during 2007-10 is 
similar to that during 2001-06. 
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overperforming their non-resource rich peers after a long period of weak growth. In fact, 
PNG grew well above the regional average even in the 1990s. There have been changes in 
fortune in the opposite direction, too. Fiji, for instance, after outperforming most of its 
neighbors for most of the period, registered one of the slowest growth rates in the past decade. 
As we will discuss later, this has been largely a result of domestic developments. Appendix I 
provides a graphical view of long-term growth in a number of PICs. 
Growth in PICs has been volatile, but on average, it has exhibited similar levels of volatility 
as other groups of developing countries 
(Figure 3). It is worth noting that growth 
volatility was high in the 1970s and 1980s 
for countries with available data. In the 
1990s, volatility remained high for all 
groups except the ECCU. The 2000s 
witnessed noticeable declines in volatility 
for all groups except ECCU, which 
experienced its most volatile period in 
four decades. PICs had lower growth 
volatility (along with the slowest growth 
rate) in the 2000s. This is in sharp contrast with ECCU, where volatility increased while 
growth slowed.   
III.   GROWTH CONSTRAINTS IN SMALL STATES 
So why have PICs tended to grow less rapidly than peer groups and why has growth slowed 
over the past decade? In this section, we focus on the first question and leave the discussion 
of the second to Section VI. In what follows, we first provide a review of the literature on 
growth determinants, focusing on salient constraints facing small states. This is then followed, 
in Sections IV and V, by an empirical examination of key growth determinants in PICs and 
other small states. 
Research on the determinants of growth and volatility in PICs has been closely related to 
“special problems of small states” (Streeten, 1993).6 Such special problems are inevitably 
                                                 
6 There is no consensus on the definition of small states—not only have various variables (e.g., population, 
GDP, and geographic area) been used as a criterion, but also various thresholds for the same variable. The 
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linked to country size and geographical location and issues that arise from these unique 
characteristics of small states, and PICs in particular. Small country size gives rise to not 
only diseconomies of scale if domestic market is relied upon as the main source of demand, 
but also difficulties with industrial clustering, a way in which modern manufacturing (e.g., 
electronics and toys) and service industries (e.g., financial and information technology) 
reduce production costs.7 The geographical location of many small states, and of PICs in 
particular, makes them remote and/or insular from major international markets, raising the 
cost of transportation and communication. Coupled with the effect of country borders 
(including trade restrictions),8 this means that small countries are less able to exploit 
economies of scale and hence suffer from lower productivity, if not lower growth of 
productivity.9 Small states also face high unit cost in providing public goods because of 
indivisibility of such goods (World 
Bank, 2010; Commonwealth 
Secretariat and World Bank, 2000). 
Thus, theory suggests that PICs are 
particularly disadvantaged by their 
country size and location in terms of 
production costs and economic 
integration. Figure 4 shows that not 
only are many PICs small, but they 
also tend to be more remote than 
                                                                                                                                                       
threshold for population, the most commonly used variable, has ranged from anywhere around one million to 15 
million (see Armstrong and Read, 2003). 
7 Some potential advantages of being small have also been discussed in the literature. These include flexibility 
in adapting to changes in the external environment, more homogeneous population, size-induced greater 
openness, and lower chance of implementing costly import substitution. See Streeten (1993), Easterly and 
Kraay (2000), and Armstrong and Reed (1998; 2003). 
8 See McCallum (1995), Wei (1996), and Anderson, J., van Wincoop (2004) for the effect of international 
borders on trade. McCallum (1995) found that Canadian provinces trade up to 22 times more with each other 
than with U.S. states. 
9 Milner and Westaway (1993) explore the medium-term growth effects of country size through possible capital 
shallowing, restricted structural change, barriers to catching up, and limited domestic technological diffusion. 
The authors find some evidence of capital shallowing and greater barriers in technological diffusion.  
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most other small countries. Smallness may not be a disadvantage if a country is surrounded 
by large, prosperous countries (e.g., Luxembourg) that offer large markets without significant 
trade barriers. For PICs, their small size and location re-enforce their disadvantages: 
remoteness increases their cost of transportation, raising the cost of exporting and importing, 
which in turn also raise the cost of domestic production and exports;10 at the same time, 
smallness tends to add further to transport costs, either because of weak competition (e.g., 
fewer airlines and shipping companies), higher infrastructure costs (e.g., fewer resources for 
building efficient ports), or small transport volumes (e.g., containers not fully utilized). Thus, 
while small can be beautiful, remoteness hardly is, as far as economic efficiency is concerned. 
In contrast to the theory, empirical evidence on the effects of smallness and remoteness on 
income and economic growth is inconclusive. In an extensive survey, Armstrong and Read 
(2003) conclude that there is no evidence that small states grow more slowly despite a priori 
expectations. Furthermore, evidence is also weak on the negative impact of “islandness” on 
growth. This is, however, somewhat surprising given that the literature has demonstrated that 
landlocked countries—which face similar challenges to island countries in terms of isolation-
induced transportation and communication costs—tend to grow more slowly than coastal 
countries (Gallup et al., 1998; Hausmann, 2001). If these conclusions are true, there must be 
some intrinsic characteristics of small states that enable them to offset their geography-
related disadvantages. 
Greater trade openness has been found to be one such key offsetting factor. Small states tend 
to have higher trade to GDP ratios than larger countries. Easterly and Kraay (2000) find that 
the benefits of this greater trade openness offset the adverse impact of greater output 
volatility in small states.11 In the sample that Easterly and Kraay used, small states have a 
ratio of trade to GDP that is 54 percentage points higher than the average economy and the 
                                                 
10 Redding and Venables (2004) find that the geography of access to markets and sources of supply is an 
important determinant of income levels across countries. Their results indicate that halving a country’s distance 
from all its trade partners increases its per capita income by around 25 percent. Similarly, using data on costs of 
doing business, Winters and Martins (2004) show that for both clothing and electronic assembly, micro-
economies have cost inflation factors of 36 percent, and that for tourism the factor is 58 percent. The last is 
driven substantially by high costs for personal travel (and the high share of such travel in overall packages). 
11 Srinivasan (1986) argued that smallness is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for slow growth and 
development. Milner and Westaway (1993) find that there is no obvious link between medium-term growth 
performance and a range of attributes of country size. 
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effect of this greater openness is 2½ times larger than the negative effect of greater output 
volatility. The authors conclude that even if output volatility is one of the consequences of 
openness, small states’ greater openness is still on balance a positive factor for small states’ 
growth. Of course, greater volatility is not the only (or even the most important) disadvantage 
facing small states. 
Because of small states’ greater trade openness, their growth performance is more closely 
linked to the growth performance of their key trading partners. Countries that are located in a 
more dynamic and prosperous region are likely to grow faster than those in a stagnating 
region, and vice visa. Some empirical research find supporting evidence for this hypothesis 
(Armstrong and Read 2000). In a similar vein, Gibson and Nero (2006) found that growth in 
small states are heavily influenced by the growth of neighboring countries that are located 
within 35 degrees of latitude or longitude (a distance of approximately 3,900 kilometers at 
the equator).12 Their results show that each percentage point increase in the average growth 
rate of this neighborhood raises the GDP growth rate of small states in the region by 0.54 
percentage point. Looking at this type of growth linkages from a different angle, Bertram 
(2003) finds that the per capita GDP of small island economies and its growth through time, 
are explained to a large extent by the closeness of the political linkages tying each island to a 
corresponding metropolitan patron and the level of per capita GDP in the metropolitan patron 
economy. Estimates show that for each dollar increase in the per capita GDP in the patron 
economy, there is a 30-56 cent increase in the per capita GDP of island states. 
IV.   MODEL, DATA AND METHODOLOGIES 
Model specification 
The review above suggests that it is not clear how important geography-related disadvantages 
are in determining small island states’ growth performance relative to common constraints 
facing all countries. In what follows, we take a more comprehensive approach to the analysis 
of growth determinants, using a cross-section dataset covering the period 1992-2008 for 45 
small states (see Appendix II Table 1 for the country list). Our aim here is to test within this 
relatively homogenous group of small island states what differentiates the growth 
performance of PICs from their peers. Once growth determinants are identified, we evaluate 
                                                 
12 Gibson and Nero (2006) also find that long-run growth in small states is also adversely affected by output 
volatility and language diversity.   
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their relative magnitude of impact. This would allow us to assess potential payoffs from 
policy actions to influence these determinants. Our approach is to start with parsimonious 
specifications and move on to more comprehensive and sophisticated specifications. 
The model employed in the current study is the growth-initial level model, which is also 
called the beta-convergence model. The development of the beta-convergence literature has 
reached a high level of sophistication, thanks to the efforts of Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Islam (2003a, 2003b). The basic form of the 
growth-initial level equation can be expressed as follows:  
(1) 
i
 τλ
0 i,
 τλ
ii
 τλ
i,0
 τλ
i
εX  γ0)e(tglnA)e(1
δ)]gln(n)[ln(sα1
α)e(1))ln(ye(1gy



   
where gy is the average growth of per capita GDP over the period under study; the subscript 
denotes province i; – (1 – e-λt) captures convergence effect, with – (1 – e-λt) < 0 providing 
evidence that economies converge to their respective steady-state levels of income, i.e. beta-
convergence, while – (1 – e-λt) > 0 indicating beta-divergence. The rate of convergence, λ, 
can be restored from the estimated coefficient; y0 is real per capita GDP in the initial year; s 
is the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP; n is the growth rate of total population, 
g denotes technological progress, δ is physical capital depreciation rate, and X is a variable 
matrix which represents variables other than those related to beta-convergence in determining 
economic growth. In this study we set g + δ = 5%.13 Furthermore, by making the restriction 
that the coefficients of ln(s) and ln(n + g + δ) have identical magnitudes but different signs as 
in Equation (1), one is able to obtain the output share of physical capital, α.  However, if this 
restriction is not supported by empirical analysis, as in the current study, the growth-
convergence model should have the following expression: 
(2) iii3i2i,010i εX  γδ)gln(nβ)ln(sβ)ln(yββgy   
where β1 = – (1 – e-λt).  
                                                 
13 Most studies in the literature assume a same value of g + δ for all countries and the most frequently used 
value is 0.05. See, for example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Islam (1995), Yao and Zhang (2001) and 
Chen (2012).  
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Data description  
Our data are from the databases of the United Nations, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. All money values are in constant 2005 prices in US dollars. In general, 45 
small countries are covered in the present study, but due to limitations on data availability for 
certain series such as aid and distance, some regressions cover 40 or 39 countries. Statistics 
of the relevant series are summarized in Appendix II Table A2. The following are used as 
relevant growth determinants while average real growth of per capita GDP over 1992-2008 
(denoted by gy) as the dependent variable:  
 GDP per capita in 1992, denoted by ln(y0). It captures the convergence effect. 
 Investment-to-GDP (%), denoted by ln(investment rate). Values of this variable are 
averaged over 1992-2008. 
 Population growth together with the physical capital depreciation rate and cost of 
technological progress (%), denoted by ln(n + g + d). Values of this variable are averaged 
over 1992-2008. 
 Foreign aid-to-GNI ratio (%), denoted by Aid/GNI. Because of data limitations, the most 
recent data (2007) was used. The validity of this proxy is supported by a strong linear 
correlation between the aid-to-GNI ratio in 2007 and the average aid-to-GNI ratio over 
different available years during the period 1992-2007.  
 Political stability. This series is obtained from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (2011 Update). The data is averaged over available years over 1996-2008. We 
also tried other governance indicators from the same source but only the Political 
Stability indicator is found robust. 
 Exports-to-GDP ratio (%), denoted by Exports/GDP. It measures export openness. We 
also tried imports-to-GDP and trade-to-GDP ratios, but found them less robust. Values of 
this variable are averaged over 1992-2008. 
 Growth volatility, measured by standard deviation of GDP growth rates over the period 
under study. The volatility-growth nexus has been widely discussed in the literature. 
Some studies, such as Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989), 
found volatility is positively associated with growth, while others, such as Ramey and 
Ramey (1995), Aizenman and Marion (1999) and Easterly and Kraay (2000), showed a 
negative relationship. However, as noted in the literature and our observations in Section 
V, the impact of volatility on growth is often linked to some other factors that directly 
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affect growth. For instance, volatility may arise from political instability and trade 
openness. 
 Remoteness, measured by GDP-weighted distance to the capital cities of major overseas 
markets, is denoted by ln(distance). We tried several measures of remoteness such as 
distance to top three trading partners, distance to top three trading partners weighted by 
GDP, weighted distance to top three export markets/import sources/trading partners, 
average distance to other countries, and distance between producers and consumers 
within a country, and found only GDP weighted distance to capitals of major overseas 
markets helped effectively explain growth in the current study.   
 A set of dummy variables to represent continents/regions and the country of Equatorial 
Guinea, with the latter capturing its exceptional growth with the exploration of oil 
resources. This set of dummy variables is found to be important in controlling for country 
heterogeneity and mitigating the heteroskedasticity problem. Apart from this set of 
dummies, we also tried dummy variables to represent oil producers, oil exporters, 
commodity exporters, and wealthy countries, but none was found significant across 
various regressions in the current study.  
We also considered a number of other factors but found they are statistically insignificant. 
For example, we tested the importance of smallness as measured by population size. The 
insignificance of population size in the current study of small states, together with the 
significance of the same indicator in the literature (see, e.g. Easterly and Kraay 2000), 
suggests that the impact of smallness on growth may not be linear. Given the relatively 
homogenous sample we have used, this is not surprising. Other insignificant factors we 
identified include education, inflation, government expenditure, imports, size of agriculture 
and manufacturing, urban population ratio, arable land ratio, terms of trade, disaster 
indicators, trade weighted external demand, and external demand measured by top three 
export destinations’ GDP growth. Of course, the performance of these variables could be 
limited by data quality. 
Estimation Methodologies 
The analysis in this paper is based on cross-sectional data on up to 45 countries. Such a 
relatively small sample can yield instable results if large heterogeneity exists among 
observations. However, it is not the case in this study, as our regression results across various 
specifications are quite consistent, a benefit of the homogeneity of the sample. This benefit is 
also evident in the consistently high adjusted R-squared values across regressions and the 
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consistency between cross-sectional analysis and panel-data analysis that we have carried out, 
with heterogeneity of countries controlled for by country-fixed effects.14 
 
Another issue worth noting here is causality between dependent and explanatory variables. 
For instance, the causality between investment and growth is believed to be bidirectional. See, 
for example, Feeny (2005). Endogeneity of aid also receives considerable attention in the 
aid-growth literature (e.g., Mosley (1980) and Ali and Isse (2005)). Similarly, bidirectional 
causation between volatility and growth is also widely discussed in the literature. See, for 
example, Easterly and Kraay (2000) and Malik and Temple (2009). Given this, addressing 
the endogeneity problem is important in our analysis, as least squares estimates in the 
presence of endogeneity are biased and inconsistent. Instrumental variables (IVs) estimators 
should be applied instead. The Sargan test and test Hausman are employed in the current 
study to detect over-identification of external instruments and endogeneity, respectively. 
Based on test statistics, we found investment and aid do not pose an endogeneity problem to 
estimation while growth volatility does.15,16,17 Therefore, the two-stage least squares estimator 
                                                 
14 In our panel data exercise, the whole sample period 1992-2008 is divided into four time spans, namely 1992-
1996, 1996-2000, 2000-2004, and 2004-2008. Panel data analysis results are not reported here to conserve 
space, but are available upon request. 
15 To test investment endogeneity, manufacturing and mining output relative to GDP and agricultural output 
relative to GDP were used as external instruments for investment-to-GDP. The Sargan test statistic is 0.811 with 
a p-value of 0.617, therefore the null hypothesis that external instruments are valid is not rejected. However, the 
Hausman test statistic of 1.618 with p-value of 0.203 provides strong evidence that the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is not rejected.  
16 For Aid-to-GDP endogeneity test, we considered external instruments such as the education index, deaths 
caused by natural disasters, government expenditure/GDP, and primary industry output/GDP. Only government 
expenditure/GDP and primary industry output/GDP are found to be valid external instruments based on the 
Wald parameter test (F-statistic = 13.45). Over-identification of parameters is confirmed by a Sargan chi-
squared statistic of 0.453 with p-value of 0.5011. However the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (with a chi-squared 
statistic of 0.46481 and p-value of 0.495) provides no evidence that Aid-to-GNI in the analysis is endogenous. 
Nonetheless, the two-stage least squares estimator was applied to address any potential endogeneity, but the 
results obtained are similar to those using the ordinary least squares estimator. 
17 To test for endogeneity of growth volatility, we used political stability and exports-to-GDP as external 
instruments. The Sargan test statistic of 0.111 with p-value of 0.739 strongly indicates that external instruments 
are valid, and the Hausman test statistic of 9.316 with p-value of 0.002 provides strong evidence that volatility 
is endogenous. 
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is employed to estimate those regressions in which growth volatility is included as a 
regressor; otherwise least squares estimator is applied. 
 
The estimation of the specified model follows a simple-to-general strategy, namely, we first 
test for the neoclassical growth theory by assessing effects of ln(y0), ln(s) and ln(n + g + d) 
jointly, and then add and test for additional control factors one at a time. 18 This approach help 
us identify relevant determinants while avoiding biased estimates caused by omitted relevant 
variables and minimizing the loss in the efficiency of estimates caused by including 
irrelevant variables.  
V.   DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH IN SMALL STATES  
Regression results suggest that geography has a large influence over economic growth in 
PICs (Table 1).19 After controlling for a number of variables that are found to be statistically 
significant as determinants of growth (see below), PICs are shown to suffer a distance-related 
disadvantage in per capita GDP growth of about 1½ percentage points compared with an 
average non-Pacific small state.20 To put this in perspective, PICs’ annual average per capita 
GDP growth over the period 1992-2008 was a little over 0.7 percent. Without the 
geographical disadvantage, PICs could have grown more than three times as fast as they 
actually managed to achieve during the period. 
However, as important as it is, geography is not the only factor that has contributed to the 
slower growth of the PIC economies compared to other small states. Growth in small states is
                                                 
18  We also tried a specification with human capital as a growth determinant. We used various proxies for 
human capital, such as the education index, the human development index (both from the United Nations 
database) and the secondary school enrolment rate, but none of them was found statistically important in 
explaining growth experience in small states. Data limitation in terms of time coverage may have affected the 
results. 
19 Discussions hereafter are based on regressions 2 and 3 in Table 1. 
20 Small states in Africa also suffer a geography-related disadvantage, but PICs are subject to by far the largest 
disadvantage among small states. We run two models, one using trade-weighted distance and the other regional 
dummies to capture the impact of geography on growth. Not surprisingly, we found the two variables are 
correlated, and including one in the regression would render the other insignificant. Moreover, the estimated 
impact of the two sets of variables on PIC growth is similar, confirming that distance is the main source of 
growth disadvantage. Distance is measured as GDP-weighted physical distance to the capital cities of major 
markets.  
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Table 1. Regressions on per capita GDP Growth of Small Island Countries  
ESTIMATION METHOD (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS 
VARIABLE Coef. [t-stat] Coef. [t-stat] Coef. [t-stat] Coef. [t-stat] 
Pacific 
Constant 
ln(y0) 
ln(invest. rate) 
ln(n + g + d) 
Aid/GNI 
Political stability 
Exports/GDP 
Growth volatility 
ln(distance) 
-3.13 
7.00 
  -0.13 
1.23 
-3.21 
[-3.33] 
[1.56] 
[-0.58] 
[2.11] 
[-2.04] 
-1.90 
15.68 
-1.30 
1.05 
-4.06 
-0.05 
1.25 
0.03 
[-2.11] 
[3.47] 
[-3.80] 
[1.78] 
[-2.61] 
[-2.09] 
[2.50] 
[2.07] 
35.09
-1.36
1.08
-3.94
-0.06
1.41
0.04
-2.31
 
[2.90] 
[-4.77]  
[2.20]  
[-3.32]  
[-2.44]  
[3.19]  
[2.79]  
 
[-1.91] 
-1.77 
15.41 
-0.87 
1.72 
-4.62 
-0.07 
 
 
-0.36 
 
[-2.01] 
[3.34] 
[-3.36] 
[3.20] 
[-2.84] 
[-2.83] 
 
 
[-2.69] 
Sample size 45 40 39 40 
Adjusted/centered R2 0.8161 0.8786 0.9068 0.8818 
Variance inflation factor (mean VIF) 2.33 2.33 1.99 - 
Breusch-Pagan (p-value) 0.3634 0.4534 0.7104 - 
Sargan statistic - - - 0.7387 
Notes:  
1. y0, representing initial per capita income in 1992, measures convergence effect; Saving rate is gross fixed 
capital formation out of GDP; n + g + d is population growth, g is technological progress rate and d is 
capital depreciation rate. g + d = 0.05 is adopted in this study; Political stability is one of governance 
indicators provided by the World Bank; Growth volatility is measured by standard deviation of per capita 
GDP growth rate; and Distance is weighted distance to major overseas markets. 
2. Dummy variables are included to represent Equatorial Guinea and continents such as Africa, America, 
Europe and Pacific, which help to control for the heteroskedasticity problem. 
3. Regressions 1~3 employ the ordinary least squares estimator while Regression 4 employs the two-stage 
least squares estimator. Growth volatility is found to be endogenous in the current study, and political 
stability and exports/GDP are used as instrument variables for growth volatility whose validity as efficient 
instruments is confirmed by the Sargan statistic. More description on endogeneity test is in footnote 15. 
4. As noted in the regressions, impacts of political stability and exports-to-GDP not only directly work on 
growth but also indirectly via affecting growth volatility.  
5. Variance inflation factor (mean VIF) is used to detect the collinearity of the regressors with the constant. 
A mean VIF of less than 10 can be taken as no evidence of collinearity problem. Breusch-Pagan test is 
employed to test for heteroskedasticity. A p-value greater than a preferred significance level can be taken 
as no evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
6. All regressors are significant at least at the 10% level, with most of them significant at either 1% or 5% 
level. 
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 influenced by a number of other variables—initial income levels, investment, population 
growth, aid, export openness, growth volatility, and political stability, all of which were 
found to be statistically significant. When combined, these variables collectively lower the 
per capital GDP growth in PICs by about another percentage point, compared with an 
average small states, with some variables making positive contributions and others negative. 
To start with, PICs’ initial income works to their advantage as PICs were on average poorer 
than other small states in the early 1990s, the time our initial income calculations are based 
upon. Based on the convergence effect found in the regressions, this lower initial income has 
allowed PICs to grow about ½ percentage point faster than an average non-Pacific small state 
Lower investment (as percent of GDP) explains a part of the slower growth in PICs. Over the 
period 1992-2008, investment in PICs averaged 22½ percent of GDP, about 6 percentage 
points lower than the average of all small states. Had PICs been able to achieve the average 
investment rate of non-Pacific small states, their real per capita GDP growth would have 
been about ¼ percentage point higher. Given the data limitation, we were not able to 
disaggregate the investment data into public and private components or by economic sector.21 
Detailed analysis is needed to identify at the country level what type of investment would be 
most productive, but results here suggests that PICs do have a catch-up to do when 
benchmarked against other small states. Moreover, there are large variations in the 
investment rate among PICs. For instance, Fiji’s investment rate is 14 percent of GDP while 
that of Vanuatu is 20 percent. This translates to a difference in the growth rate of ¼ 
percentage point.  
Greater export-orientation makes a strong positive contribution to growth among small states. 
On average each 10 percentage point increase in the exports-to-GDP ratio raises per capita 
GDP growth by about 0.3 percentage point. Since the exports-to-GDP ratio in PICs is 24 
percentage points lower than the average of non-Pacific small states, this implies that PICs 
could have grown by 0.6 percentage point faster had they exported as much as other small 
states (in percent of GDP). We find that greater imports as percent of GDP have no 
statistically significant impact on growth. This suggests that unlike evidence found for some 
other countries, imports have not been associated with technological transfers that benefit 
growth in small states. This in turn may reflect the fact that the imports in small states more 
                                                 
21 We did include secondary education in the regression in an attempt to capture the effect of human capital on 
growth. However, the results are statistically insignificant. 
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often consist of consumer goods, rather than intermediate inputs or capital goods that 
embody newer technologies and help improve local productivity. Moreover, imports in small 
states are more likely to be linked to aid-funded projects that tend to have weaker linkages 
with the local economy. Similarly, we also find no evidence that openness measured by the 
ratio of trade turnover (exports plus imports) to GDP has any positive impact on growth.   
Part of the benefits from greater export openness is offset by increased output volatility 
arising from larger exports (as percent of GDP). Estimates show that each 10 percentage 
point change in export openness is associated with 0.2 percentage point change in the 
standard deviation of GDP growth.22 Given this, less than a quarter of the growth benefits 
from greater export openness is nullified by the associated increase in output volatility, 
leaving PICs worse off by about 0.5 percentage point from their lower openness compared 
with other small states.  
Aid is found to be associated with slower GDP growth. In almost all regressions we have 
tested, the relationship between aid and growth is negative. For each 10 percentage point 
increase in aid as percent of GDP, growth is lower by 0.6 percentage point. Our preliminary 
tests show that there is no reverse causality, that is, slower growth does not lead to more aid; 
it is more aid that leads to slower growth. It is not clear how aid might slow growth in small 
states, though the most commonly cited mechanism is the Dutch disease effect—a 
phenomenon of weak export competitiveness resulting from real exchange rate appreciation 
caused by capital inflows, such as aid. Having said that, it must be noted that the negative 
relationship found between aid and growth should not be interpreted as aid lowering 
economic welfare. In fact, much aid is often aimed at reducing poverty rather than increasing 
economic growth.23 Unfortunately, we are unable to disaggregate aid into different categories 
in this analysis, so the estimated impact here applies to total aid, rather than part of the aid 
that is likely to enhance growth, such as aid used for improving infrastructure and increasing 
investment in other productive sectors. Moreover, if aid helps improve living standards in 
                                                 
22 This result is illustrative only. Our estimates are significant only at 83 percent confidence level, and the 
sample size is small (28 observations). However, the result is consistent with that reported in Easterly and 
Kraay (2000). 
23 The relationship between aid and growth is hotly contested subject in the Pacific, as is globally. See Bowman 
and Chand (2008), Rao, Sharma and Sing (2008), Pavlov and Sugden (2006), and Hughes (2003). 
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terms of education and health, it could help raise growth in the long run that may not have 
been captured in this analysis. 
Political stability is an important source of faster growth. Measured by the World Bank 
Political Stability index, PICs score more favorably on political stability than other small 
states. This gives PICs, on average, an advantage of 0.3 percentage point in growth over 
other small states. It should be noted, however, that political stability varies substantially 
among PICs themselves. Other things being equal, the highest-scoring country in the region 
has a growth advantage of more than one percentage point over the lowest-scoring country.  
To sum up the results, PICs have relatively low performance in export openness and 
investment, but do better than other small states in maintaining political stability. On balance, 
these policy-related factors, together 
with geography-related disadvantage, 
have led to growth rates that are much 
lower than in other small states. 
Figure 5 shows a rough decomposition 
of the impact of the various 
determinants on PICs’ growth, 
benchmarked against the average 
growth rate of non-Pacific small states. 
The first bar from the left depicts the 
per capita GDP growth rate of non-
Pacific small states during 1992-2008. Each of the bars to the right shows, cumulatively, the 
impact of a growth determinant, with red hollow segments showing negative impact (blue 
segments showing the remaining growth rate after the negative impact), and solid green 
segments representing positive impact.24 The blue bar in the far right shows the actual growth 
rate in PICs during the period. It is clear from the graph that lower export openness, aid and 
investment, along with PICs’ geographical disadvantage, are the main contributors to their 
lower growth compared with other small states.   
The results presented above should be interpreted with great caution. Data quality is always 
an issue in such exercises, and this is especially true for data on small states. While the 
                                                 
24 The third bar shows the results when using distance to capture the effect of geography, instead of regional 
dummies, shown in the second bar. 
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results are generally consistent across model specifications, they are subject to data 
limitations and should be further tested for robustness as data and other information improve. 
Perhaps even more important, the interpretation of the results should be guided by economic 
conditions pertaining to the countries in question. For instance, while we found that greater 
export openness is good for growth, it may not be equally feasible for all PICs to increase 
goods or non-factor services exports, particularly for micro-states which have few resources 
to produce such exports. Similarly, while low investment is generally a constraint on growth 
in PICs, countries need to identify what impediments investors might be facing and what 
projects might bring highest social returns.25 Moreover, any scaling up of investment should 
also take into account debt sustainability if it is financed by borrowing. Capacity constraints 
at any particular time may also affect the effectiveness of investment. 
VI.   WHY HAS PIC GROWTH SLOWED? 
The above analysis provides a broad explanation for the relatively slow growth in PICs over 
the long run, but it sheds little light on why growth has slowed in many PICs over the past 
decade. In this section, we use the framework established in the previous section to explore 
possible explanations of the growth slowdown. We begin this exercise by dividing the 
sample period (1992-2008) into two sub-periods (1992-2000 and 2001-08) to gauge the 
extent to which the determinants identified earlier can explain the growth slowdown in the 
second period (2001-08). Statistical tests suggest that there were no significant structural 
breaks in growth for the entire sample of small states. Given this, the same set of regression 
coefficients from the previous 
section can be used to predict 
growth rates based on the level of 
the determinants in the two sub-
periods.  
It appears that a decline in the 
exports-to-GDP ratio is a major 
contributor to the growth 
slowdown over the past decade. 
Investment increased slightly, 
                                                 
25 A growth diagnosis approach could be employed in such analysis. See Duncan and Nakagawa (2006) for 
growth diagnosis for six Pacific island countries. 
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which should have helped raise growth, as should lower output volatility. The positive effects 
of these developments should add up to over half percentage point. On the other hand, the 
average export openness ratio fell by as much as 4½ percentage points in the 2000s from its 
1990s level (Figure 6).26 While there are undoubtedly other factors (including country-
specific ones) that have not been included in the model but have contributed to the slower 
growth in the 2000s, the decline in export openness, though far from fully explaining the 
growth slowdown, points to a weakness in an area that is key to mitigating the growth 
disadvantage of small states—integration with the global economy.  
While the decline in trade openness over the past decade may partly reflect external shocks, it 
may also indicate weakening competitiveness in some cases. In several PICs, growth began 
to decelerate well before the hikes of world food and fuel prices in 2007-08. At least seven 
out of the 11 countries had slower growth in 2001-06 than in 1991-2000. For the 11 PICs as a 
group, average growth in 2001-06 was a little over half the rate of the 1990s and was similar 
to the average growth of 2007-10, a period full of adverse shocks. In some cases, external 
shocks seem to have had lasting impact on productive capacity and weakened growth 
fundamentals, as the experience of Samoa has shown following the devastating 2009 
Tsunami and the global financial crisis (Box 1). Countries in such circumstances may need to 
re-assess their competitiveness position and adapt their strategies to regain growth 
momentum. 
Real exchange rate appreciation may 
have played an important part in 
weakening competitiveness in a number 
of countries. In contrast to the 1990s, 
when only Solomon Islands 
experienced an appreciation of the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), over 
the past decade the REER has 
appreciated for all six countries that 
have their own currencies except Fiji   
                                                 
26 We split the 2000s into two sub-periods, 2000-06 and 2007-10, to see if the lower exports-to-GDP ratio in the 
2000s was a result of the external shocks—food and fuel price increases and the global financial crisis. The data 
indicate this is not the case. 
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Box 1. Samoa: Managing Shocks and Regaining Growth Momentum 
The Samoan economy had been growing strongly until the mid 2000s when it seems to have lost 
momentum. Well coordinated reforms in the mid-1990s and sound macroeconomic policies delivered 
an annual average GDP growth rate of 5 percent during this period. Investment in the lead up to the 
2007 Pacific Games provided another boost before a series of shocks hit the economy—the food and 
fuel price hikes, a devastating tsunami, and the global financial crisis. Economic growth has since 
slowed significantly despite a large boost to government expenditure in FY2009/10 - 2011/2012, with 
an average overall fiscal deficit of 7.3 percent of GDP. Real GDP growth between 2006/07 to 
2010/11 averaged only 0.3 percent, the slowest since the mid 1960s (see graph below).  
 
The large infrastructure rebuilding and reconstruction effort of the government following the 2009 
tsunami was well supported by development partners through grants and concessional loans. 
However, Samoa’s public debt has continued to rise, reaching well over 50 percent of GDP at the end 
of FY 2010/11. Meanwhile, tourism and remittances, two pillars of the Samoan economy, have 
recovered only slowly, and the Yazaki automotive component plant has been declining since the 
global financial crisis erupted in 2008. Moreover, agriculture has been stagnating in recent years. 
Samoa now faces a difficult path to wind down its fiscal deficits while the private sector has not 
picked up the slack. The government is committed to bringing down public debt to a more sustainable 
level over the medium term to maintain hard won macroeconomic stability. While the fiscal 
consolidation is essential for long-term sustainability, it may add further headwinds to an already 
weak recovery. Given the considerable real exchange rate appreciation over the recent years and weak 
global demand, great efforts would be needed to strengthen competitiveness and revitalize private 
sector-led growth.  
Samoa’s recent experience highlights the vulnerability of a small island economy’s competitiveness 
to exogenous shocks. Competitiveness can be undermined quickly by such shocks and it would take 
coordinated efforts to regain it. A re-assessment of the economy’s underlying strength and growth 
potential may be needed, and this would help establish a macroeconomic framework to regain 
competiveness and to maintain macroeconomic stability over the medium term. Structural reform 
needs to progress further to provide a more favorable environment for the private sector to take a lead 
role in economic development. Samoa has a strong track record of reform and the government’s 
continued commitment to keeping this record bodes well for future progress. 
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and Solomon Islands (Figure 7).27 Even in these two countries, there were periods of rapid 
appreciation prior to the sharp devaluations in 2009.  Except PNG which has a floating 
exchange rate regime, all other five countries are pegged to a basket that includes the 
Australian and US dollars, among other key trading partner currencies. While domestic 
prices have been rising more rapidly than those in trading partners, there have been limited 
movements in nominal effective exchange rates over time, leading to considerable real 
appreciation in some cases, such as Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu, even before the hikes of global 
food and fuel prices. In the case of PNG and (to a lesser extent) Solomon Islands, the 
appreciation since 2008 has also been driven by the commodity booms, which have boosted 
export earnings and foreign direct 
investment inflows. In the five 
countries that do not have their 
own currencies, those that use the 
Australian dollar (Kiribati and 
Tuvalu) have experienced sharp 
real appreciation while those that 
use the US dollar (Micronesia, 
Palau, and Marshall Islands) have 
not seen any real appreciation or 
even experienced depreciation 
(Figure 8). It should be noted that 
the exchange rate appreciation has not in general led to declines in foreign reserves. In fact, 
in most cases, reserves as measured by import coverage have risen since the global financial 
crisis. In some cases, this partly reflects weak import demand resulting from slow economic 
activity, but also generous donor support. As economic recovery strengthens over time, 
reserves may stop cumulating or even fall.   
  
                                                 
27 These six countries are Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. 
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The evolution of the current account is indicative of the change in external competitiveness 
over time. While the 2007-08 food and fuel price increases and global financial crisis have 
certainly contributed to this 
development in recent years, the 
deterioration started before these 
shocks (Figure 9). The trade 
account has also deteriorated, 
albeit by much less (Figure 10). It 
is worth noting, however, that the 
North Pacific states (FSM, RMI, 
and Palau) saw an improvement 
in the trade balance in the 2000s 
and countries that had REER 
appreciation experienced larger 
increases in the trade deficit than 
other countries. Again in the case 
of PNG, it should be noted that 
the deterioration of the current 
account also reflects the 
investment boom associated with 
the LNG project. In the case of 
Samoa, it was largely due to 
increases in imports as a result of 
post-tsunami reconstruction, 
although the strong Tala may also 
have helped boost imports in general. It is worth noting that the increase in the trade deficit 
has occurred despite the rapid growth of tourism exports over the past decade in some 
countries—Fiji, Palau, Samoa, and Vanuatu.  
Given the real exchange rate appreciation and deteriorating export performance in many PICs, 
it is tempting to link the weakening competitiveness to the aid-induced Dutch disease effect 
referred to earlier in the econometric analysis. However, it should be noted that PICs’ 
competitiveness may have also been affected by the changing external trade environment. As 
part of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group, PICs have benefitted from non-
reciprocal trade preferences under the successive Lomé Conventions (first signed in 1975) 
and subsequently the Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000). Fiji’s sugar exports, at higher 
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than world prices, are one example of such benefits. Trade preferences under the Cotonou 
Agreement have been eroded or are being phased out, reducing PICs’ export competitiveness. 
Closer to home, non-reciprocal trade preferences offered by Australia and New Zealand 
under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement 
(SPARTECA, signed in 1981) are also being eroded as the two countries liberalize their trade 
over time. Under SPARTECA, for example, Fiji was able to export large volumes of 
garments to Australia and New Zealand, but as the preference margins have shrunk—
especially when restrictions under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing were phased out 
in 2005, so have Fiji’s exports.28 Negotiations on a Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations Plus (PACER-Plus) to achieve the long-term goal of a ‘single regional market’ 
among Pacific Islands Forum members have moved slowly.29 In recent years, PICs have also 
missed out on proliferating regional trade arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. Only Papua New 
Guinea is a member of APEC, and no PICs are members of any other major regional 
groupings or regional trade arrangements in Asia.  
The evolution of PICs’ trade patterns in recent years may have reflected these developments 
in the trade policy environment. Like all other groups of developing countries, PICs’ 
traditional markets—the European Union and North America—have become less dominant.30 
The developments in the Australian and New Zealand markets, however, are different 
between the resource-rich and non-resource-rich PICs. The Australian and New Zealand 
Markets have become more important for PNG and Solomon Islands over time, while their 
role for other PICs has fallen sharply. In the non-traditional markets, the two groups of PICs 
have also gone in different directions. While PNG and Solomon Islands have shifted to China 
from other Asian countries, the other PICs have moved in the opposite direction, reflecting 
the growing importance of Southeast Asian markets over time. Non-resource rich PICs are 
the only group of countries that have seen less of their exports going to China over time. 
Taking Asia as a whole, these PICs have diversified their exports to Asia despite their 
inability to penetrate the fast-growing Chinese market. Lack of mineral resources and supply 
constraints on other commodities are probably the key reasons. 
                                                 
28 According to Wikipedia, in 1997 the textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) industry accounted for 26 percent 
of Fiji’s total domestic exports; it contributed to some 3.5 percent of GDP and provided employment for about 
18,000 people that accounted for 16 percent of those in total paid employment. 
29 Negotiations on PACER-Plus was triggered under PACER in 2007. 
30 Data are available only for Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu. 
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Figure 11: Export Market Shares for Comparative Country Groups 
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Without taking the advantage of Asia markets, it is not surprising that overall PIC exports 
have grown considerably more slowly over the past decade than other groups of small states 
and low-income countries (Figure 12, first chart). It should be noted, however, that PICs did 
quite well in the 1990s, over-performing all other groups. During the next decade, however, 
while PICs broadly maintained their growth rates, other groups of countries surged ahead—
exports from small states and SSA grew more than three times as fast as PICs, and low-
income countries grew more than twice as fast. A key driver of the strong export growth in 
small states, LICs and Sub-Saharan Africa has been Asian markets, especially the Chinese 
market, as shown by the extraordinarily high growth rates in Figure 12 and the drastic 
increase in the share of the Chinese market shown in Figure 11.  
Figure 12: Export Markets for Comparative Country Groups 
(Real annual growth rate, in percent) 
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Box 2. Why Tourism Recovery Varies so Much across PICs 
Recent experience with the recovery of tourism in PICs shows the importance of linking to Asian 
markets and the role of economic policy in determining tourism growth. Being much closer to Asia, 
Palau has benefitted immensely from the region. Taiwan (Province of China) and Japan account for 
some two-thirds of Palau’s total tourist arrivals in recent years, and tourists from these two and other 
Asian sources have increased rapidly, helped by more charter flights from Asia. In contrast, all other 
four Pacific island countries have most of their tourist arrivals coming from Australia and New 
Zealand, which together account for two-thirds to three-quarters of total arrivals. Despite having a 
similar external environment, namely relatively strong growth of the Australian and New Zealand 
economies, Fiji’s tourism has grown strongly while that of Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu has been slow 
or stagnating.  
 
As with merchandise trade, exchange rate policy seems to have played an important part in explaining 
the varying performances. Palau uses the US dollar as its legal tender, and the dollar’s weakness 
relative to Asian currencies has helped Palau’s competitiveness. In contrast, all other four countries 
have pegged their currency to a basket that includes the strong Australian dollar. This has led to 
appreciation of their currencies against the US dollar, except Fiji, which devalued its currency by 
20 percent against the US dollar in April 2009. The increased competitiveness from this devaluation 
helped boost Fiji’s tourist arrivals by 17 percent in 2010.  
There may be substitution among PICs as tourist destinations. This means that if every PIC devalues 
its currency, the region as a whole may not attract more tourists. However, given the region’s 
relatively small market share in total Australian and New Zealand tourists, this substitution effect 
could be easily overstated. In any case, such effect should be limited among Asian tourists. 
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To fully understand the export performance of PICs, one also needs to take into account 
service exports, especially tourism. Among the 11 PICs covered in this paper, five (Fiji, 
Palau, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu) have significant tourism exports: tourist earnings 
accounting for somewhere between 10 percent (Tonga) to 70 percent (Palau) of GDP and 
serving as an important source of economic growth in all five countries.31 Growth as 
measured by tourist arrivals 
has varied considerably 
among the five countries 
(Figure 13). As with 
merchandise exports, North 
America, Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand are 
traditional markets and these 
market still dominate in all 
five PICs except Palau, 
which has diversified into 
Asian markets in recent 
years. As Box 3 illustrates, 
both economic policy and geography played an important role in the recent recovery of 
tourism in these five countries. 
Evolution in the cost of international transportation in recent years may have worked to the 
disadvantage of PICs in recent years. It is commonly assumed that advances in transport 
technology should have reduced disadvantages facing more remote countries. Indeed, the 
introduction of jet engines in the late 1950s and containerized shipping in the 1960s have 
substantially increased the efficiency of both air and ocean transportation over the past few 
decades. According to Hummels (2007), however, technological advances in ocean shipping 
have been largely trumped by fuel price increases, leaving ocean transport costs (as percent 
of the values of shipped goods) in the early 2000s as they were in the 1950s.32 Moreover, 
there have been rapid increases in transportation cost over the past decade, especially for air 
                                                 
31 Using a panel regression, Thacker (2011) finds a significant positive association between tourism and growth. 
A 10 percent increase in tourist arrivals per capita raises economic growth by about 0.2 percent. 
32 Note that the weight-based measures tend to overstate the decline in transport cost because the composition of 
shipped goods tends to shift toward lighter, higher-valued goods over time. 
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transportation, which has led to 
a sharp decline in the proportion 
of airlifted goods in trade after a 
long period of steady increase 
(Figures 14 and 15). For PICs, 
the increase in air transport costs 
has added substantially to the 
transport cost of perishable 
products (fish, vegetables and 
fruits). 
Other key developments in 
international transportation also 
have had mixed impacts on the 
trading costs in PICs. It is worth 
noting that containerized 
shipping was introduced in PICs 
much later (mostly in the late 
1970s and 1980s) than in other 
parts of the world, because of 
substantial investment involved, 
including in port facilities. In 
addition, competition in PICs’ 
air and ocean transport 
industries is limited because of small market size and state monopoly. As a result, the 
benefits of technological advances may not have passed onto consumers as much as in other 
parts of the world.33 One of the major benefits from technological advances over the past 
decades has been faster speed and greater reliability in shipping. This, in principle, would 
have helped island countries lower their transport cost relative to its competitors. However, 
remote, small states such as PICs do not appear to have been able to take much advantage of 
large, more efficient vessels because of their small trade volumes and the need to stop more 
frequently to serve small and dispersed destinations. Paradoxically, the technological 
                                                 
33 Kleinert and Spies (2011) find that trade partners with 10 percent more exports enjoy 0.8 percent lower 
transport prices. Favaro et al. (2008) shows how lack of competition in the telecommunications industry in 
Samoa raised costs to consumers. 
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advances appear to have given a greater advantage to exporters of manufactured goods, as 
large vessels and greater speed and reliability allow finer segmentation of value chains. 
Associated with this, as the spread between high-priced and low-priced goods in each 
product category widens, the cost advantage enjoyed by high-end goods is growing over time 
(Hummels, 2007; 2009). Thus, without high value-added exports, PICs could be increasingly 
disadvantaged by transport cost. 
VII.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
One of the key findings of the above econometric analysis is that Pacific island countries do 
seem to face lower speed limits in economic growth because of their remoteness. Growth 
volatility in PICs has also been often higher than in larger economies. It is important for 
policymakers to recognize the existence of such limits as unrealistic expectations for growth 
could lead to overly ambitious targets. Moreover, growth volatility also entails more prudent 
planning and maintaining larger policy buffers in good times.  
Admittedly, there are significant challenges in raising growth, including finding a more 
effective way to allow aid to contribute to long-term domestic productive capacity as well as 
to reduce poverty. When a country is small and relatively poor, it is likely to receive more aid 
(relative to GDP) than a large country and hence there is no need to have a more depreciated 
real exchange rate in order to keep a balanced trade or current account. This allows the small 
country to enjoy a higher living standard than it would otherwise, through better public 
services and cheaper imports. At the same time, however, this means that the export sector 
has to be very efficient in order to be able to compete on the world market even when it 
enjoys a comparative advantage. While it seems difficult to fully overcome the effects of aid-
supported strong exchange rates, PICs should nevertheless take measures to alleviate them by 
directing more aid to productivity improvements and accelerating structural reforms. 
This analysis highlights the importance and difficulty of macroeconomic policies in creating 
a competitive environment in small states. As shown earlier, neither a fixed or flexible 
exchange rate regime would guarantee such an outcome. Most PICs maintain a pegged 
exchange rate regime, which provides a useful nominal anchor. Historically, however, PICs 
tend to run higher inflation than their trading partners (as many developing countries do), and 
periodically the fixed exchange rates become unsustainable and large step devaluations 
become necessary to correct external imbalances. On the other hand, a flexible exchange rate 
(or using a foreign currency) can also lead to rapid appreciation when there are large foreign 
exchange inflows, such as aid and resource rents. Such appreciation may be necessary for 
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maintaining macroeconomic stability (i.e., controlling inflation), but it may not be consistent 
with the objective of maintaining competitiveness. In principle, such inflows can be sterilized 
through reserve accumulations, but countries often do not fully sterilize them because of 
costs involved in mopping up local currency liquidity and resulting higher domestic interest 
rates. This tends to result in higher inflation and real exchange rate appreciation. In addition, 
foreign exchange markets are shallow in PICs, and a floating exchange rate regime may 
result in large volatility in the exchange rate, which would be harmful for trade.  
This calls for better coordination of macroeconomic policies to maintaining competitiveness 
and stability. When a country maintains a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy must 
be subordinate to the exchange rate policy and ensure that inflation is not consistently higher 
than that of partner countries. Similarly, fiscal policy must be prudent to avoid pressure on 
domestic price levels and debt sustainability.34 Large windfall inflows could be saved (e.g., 
through a sovereign wealth fund) for inter-generational distribution and consumption 
smoothing. Since the global financial crisis, macroeconomic policies in PICs have been 
geared toward supporting growth; both monetary and fiscal policies have been 
accommodative. These policies are appropriate given the circumstances. However, as noted 
earlier, higher inflation resulting from rising world food and fuel prices has led to significant 
real exchange rate appreciation in a number of countries over the past few years. At the same 
time, increased aid inflows in response to the crisis have allowed many PICs to maintain or 
accumulate foreign reserves. As economic recovery strengthens, import demand increases, 
and aid inflows decline, however, these countries may face challenges to revert their real 
exchange rates to more sustainable and competitive levels. 
Structural reforms would be critical to mitigating the effects of strong exchange rates through 
higher productivity. When a country has a fixed exchange rate and faces a persistent higher 
inflation than its trading partners, raising productivity at a pace faster than trading partners is 
essentially the only way to avoid periodic devaluations. 35 Empirical research indicates that 
productivity growth in PICs has generally been slow and low investment is a key constraint 
                                                 
34 Yang at al. (2011) discussed macroeconomic policy coordination in the context of strengthening monetary 
policy transmission. 
35 One can think of the Chinese experience in recent years—the Yuan has faced pressure for appreciation 
despite China’s higher inflation than its trading partners’.  
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on higher growth, as demonstrated in the case of Fiji (Box 3).36 This is consistent with our 
findings in the previous sections that PICs need to raise the level of investment in order to 
grow faster, a conclusion that is self-evident but nevertheless particularly pertinent given 
PICs’ low investment rate compared with peer countries. Our findings that political stability 
is important for growth in PICs are similarly conventional, but they should nevertheless 
reinforce PIC governments’ resolve for better governance.  
Improving competitiveness would be difficult without aggressively reducing the cost of 
distance and insularity, a principal source of PICs’ growth disadvantage. As in the 
manufacturing sector, transportation and communication industries also exhibit economies of 
scale, and this again puts small and remote countries in disadvantage. The challenge ahead is 
not only scaling up investment in transport and communication infrastructure, but also 
continued reforms and appropriate regulation to ensure rigorous competition in these two 
industries. Greater regional cooperation could also help mitigate the effect of diseconomies 
of scale, as shown by the establishment of the Pacific Forum Line and the Pacific Islands 
Telecommunications Association. 
The ultimate way to overcome smallness and distance is further integration with the global 
economy, and trade policy can play an important role in this process. PICs will need to adapt 
to a rapidly changing landscape in world trade and finance. As trade preferences under 
colonial ties are phased out or being eroded, PICs should seek deeper integration with 
metropolitan countries, particularly in trade in labor services. Much progress has been made 
in the temporary migrant workers programs with New Zealand and Australia, but the 
potential remains large relative to the size of labor forces in PICs. In some PICs, particularly 
the smaller ones that have fewer natural resources or are constrained in developing such 
resources, increased trade in labor services provides a critical source of income generation, 
which in turn also boosts domestic activities. Given the limited job opportunities at home, 
there is little risk of brain drain. PACER-Plus provides a useful framework for further 
integration with Australia and New Zealand, and to this end greater efforts could be made to 
accelerate the negotiations.  
 
                                                 
36 Chen and Singh (2011) estimate that total factor productivity growth in Fiji over the period 1983-2007 was 
only 0.5 percent per year, less than half the rates in Asian and Pacific countries. 
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Box 3. Fiji—Lessons and Hopes 
Fiji’s economic growth has now lagged other PICs for more than two decades. Once an envy of 
the Pacific, the Fijian economy only managed an average real GDP growth of 2.1 percent over 
the past two decades. While external shocks, such as the reduction of preference margin for the 
price of sugar exports and the erosion of tariff margins for textile and clothing exports to 
Australia and New Zealand, have no doubt contributed to this disappointing record, 
developments in domestic politics and economic policies have had a strong influence on the 
economic performance.  
Since 1987, Fiji has experienced four coups. Research shows that these coups had an immediate 
negative effect on the economy (Singh, 2005; Jayaraman and Ward, 2003; and Narayan, Narayan 
and Prasad, 2006).  Sugar, garments, tourism, building, construction, gold-mining were all 
affected, along with rapid exodus of financial and human capital. In addition to the short-run 
impact, elevated uncertainty over political developments has taken a toll on private investment, 
which has been declining and volatile since 1988. 
Continuous fiscal expansion has led to increases in public debt over time, now reaching 51.5 
percent of GDP. The fiscal deficit has also increased in recent years. Despite the increases in 
government expenditure, public investment had been declining until recently, depriving the 
country of much needed maintenance and improvements in infrastructure. With a pegged 
exchange rate, inflation has been running consistently higher than major trading partners, eroding 
the economy’s competiveness and resulted in periodic devaluations. A 2009 devaluation 
provided a much needed boost to the export sector, especially the tourism industry and helped 
restore macroeconomic stability. The economy has since recovered steadily, growing 2 percent in 
2011, one of the best performances in many years. 
Slow progress in structural reforms has also reduced incentives to invest and to adapt to external 
changes. The uncertainty over government policy on the renewal of land leases contributed to 
low investment and poor productivity, slowing down the growth of sugar, tourism and other land-
based industries.  The mismanagement of the Fiji Sugar Corporation not only accelerated the 
decline of the sugar industry as a whole with the phasing out of preferential prices, but also 
placed a drain on public finances. Efforts have been made recently to address land lease 
problems, such as through the creation of the land bank, which is likely to provide more secure 
land access to investors and in turn improve returns for land owners. Efforts have also been made 
to revive the sugar industry and promote the tourism sector. 
Progress has also been made in other areas, such as relaxing foreign exchange controls and 
reducing red tape and bureaucracy, but more remains to be done. Extensive price controls, albeit 
scaled back somewhat recently, and unpredictable policy decisions have often been cited as a 
disincentive to business and further reforms in these areas would help increase investor 
confidence.  
Despite the disappointing performance over the past two decades, Fiji still possesses some  key 
advantages for faster growth over most other PICs: the country still has a relatively strong human 
capital base, a more diversified production structure including niche manufacturing industries, a 
central location in the South Pacific, and natural resources, particularly fertile arable land. With 
good policies to ensure macroeconomic stability and sound structural policies, the country can 
regain its strength in the future. 
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Further integration with the global economy should also include strengthening trade and 
financial ties with Asia. Our analysis earlier suggests that PICs without mineral resources 
have not been able to take advantage of the increasingly affluent Asian markets. This is not 
surprising given that exporting non-mineral products to Asian markets would need both 
reliable supply and marketing. Some emerging Asian economies offer duty and quota-free 
entry of goods from least developed countries (LDCs) among PICs.37 However, constraints 
on domestic supply have meant that these opportunities have not been fully utilized. For non-
LDCs among PICs, it is important to engage with Asian countries to ensure that goods from 
the Pacific are not discriminated against as these Asian countries expand their free trade 
agreements. Given the supply constraints in PICs, it may seem irrelevant to secure market 
access in Asia at this stage; but secure market access may encourage foreign investment and 
increase the awareness of goods that PICs can offer. Asian entrepreneurs could help bring 
capital as well as fill in the skill and marketing gaps in PICs. A proactive policy toward Asia 
would be important. 
VIII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In many respects, the findings of this paper are unsurprising and yet have received little 
empirical support so far: PICs do face special challenges in economic growth because of their 
disadvantages arising from geography. It is equally unsurprising that there is plenty of room 
to raise growth by increasing investment and promoting trade openness as well as ensuring 
political stability. By reaching levels in other small island states in these areas, PICs could 
substantially speed up economic growth. The key question is how to increase investment and 
openness. The good news from this study is that lower investment and exports in the Pacific 
do not seem to be entirely the result of geography. This implies that economic and other 
policies can make a difference in speeding up growth in the Pacific. The large variations in 
the performance across countries within the Pacific provide some support that policies do 
matter. Thus the key challenge is to identify and implement policies that would be most 
effective in increasing openness and productive investment based on country circumstances.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the differences in natural endowments and 
economic circumstances across Pacific island countries. Micro-states may well face quite 
different challenges from their relatively large neighbors, principally Melanesian countries. 
These differences may necessitate different priorities and approaches to promoting 
                                                 
37 UN-defined LDCs in the Pacific include Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
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investment and trade; detailed case studies would be highly desirable for formulating policy 
recommendations. There is also considerable room to refine studies like the current one, by 
updating relevant data and analysis. The fact that Pacific island countries have lagged behind 
other small states in growth over the past decade suggests that there may have been some 
fundamental changes taking place—either in policy settings or the external environment—
that have made country size and location a more determining factor than before. 
It is tempting to suggest that a competitive exchange rate is key to inducing higher 
investment and greater trade openness. While external shocks to trade and commodity prices 
seem to have contributed to the weakening competitiveness in some PICs over the past 
decade, evidence also points to the role played by macroeconomic policies. In the face of 
substantial size- and geography-induced cost disadvantages and large aid inflows, PICs need 
to manage their macroeconomic policies to ensure that their exchange rates allow domestic 
producers to compete on the world market in areas where they have a comparative advantage. 
This may prove critical to pursue private sector-led growth. 
Maintaining competitiveness also entails structural reforms to improve efficiency in 
production, transport, and communication. Many reforms have been carried out over the past 
decades, and the payoffs have been significant in some areas, as shown by marked declines 
in the cost of telecommunication following the deregulation of the telecom industry. 
However, as the quest for faster and more inclusive growth continues, PIC governments will 
need to keep searching for such high-payoff reforms. The current unfavorable global 
environment should only strengthen the resolve of PIC governments to accelerate such 
reforms. 
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Appendix I – Growth Trends in PICs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
PNG Trend Cycle
PNG
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-20
-10
0
10
20
-20
-10
0
10
20
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
Solomon Islands Trend Cycle
Solomon Islands
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
VANUATU Trend Cycle
Vanuatu
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-12
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
FIJI Trend Cycle
Fiji
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
SAMOA Trend Cycle
Samoa
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-10
0
10
20
30
40
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
TONGA Trend Cycle
Tonga
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
-8
-4
0
4
8
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
Marshall Islands
Trend
Cycle
MARSHALL ISLANDS
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-8
-4
0
4
8
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
PALAU Trend Cycle
PALAU
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
TONGA Trend Cycle
Kiribati
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20
MICRONESIA Trend Cycle
MICRONESIA, FED. STATES
Hodrick-Prescott Filter (lambda=100)
 43 
 
 
 
Appendix II. Country List and Data Description 
Table A1: Country List 
Africa (14) America (12) Europe (4) Pacific (9) Asia (6) 
Botswana Antigua and Barbuda Estonia Fiji Bahrain 
Cape Verde Bahamas, The Malta Kiribati Bhutan 
Comoros Barbados Montenegro Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Brunei Darussalam 
Djibouti Belize San Marino Palau Maldives 
Equatorial Guinea Bermuda  PNG Qatar 
Gabon Dominica  Samoa Timor-Leste 
Gambia, The Grenada  Solomon Islands  
Guinea-Bissau Guyana  Tonga  
Lesotho St. Kitts and Nevis  Vanuatu  
Mauritius St. Lucia    
Namibia St. Vincent and the Grenadines   
Sao Tome and Principe Suriname    
Seychelles     
Swaziland         
 
Table A2: Average Values of Relevant Series over 1992-2008 
  
Small 
Economies 
Non-Pacific 
Small Economies 
Pacific Island 
Countries 
Convergence effect (lnY0) 7.98 8.15 7.40 
Investment (ln(investment/GDP)) 3.26 3.33 3.04 
Population growth (ln(n+g+d)) 1.88 1.88 1.87 
Aid (aid/GNI, %) 7.96 5.69 20.01 
Political stability 0.49 0.53 0.57 
Exports (in percent of GDP) 52.11 56.97 35.08 
Volatility (growth rate standard deviation, %) 4.61 4.36 5.48 
Per capita GDP growth (%) 2.38 2.87 0.64 
GDP weighted distance to major overseas markets (ln) 9.01 8.93 9.25 
 
 
 
